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Abstract
Existing studies of housing markets assume that property developers is a 
homogenous, perfectly competitive industry. It concentrates on advanced 
economies and the impacts of market conditions, regulatory constraints, 
production characteristics, institutional structure and land supply. 
Motivated by these circumstances and fewer literature on concentration 
studies in Malaysia we try to bridging the gap. This paper utilized 5-digit 
fi rm level industry data of the Malaysian Standard Industrial Classifi cation 
(MSIC, 2008) on the average size of property developer establishments and 
market concentration to test the appropriateness of this paradigm. Our 
concentration ratio (CR4) results show Malaysian real estate services are 
considered as competitive market.
Keywords: Concentration, competition, market power, real estate services.
JEL: L1, L11, L85 
Introduction
In line with the country’s aspirations towards a high-income status by 
2020, both the government’s and the industry’s approach to housing 
provision have evolved signifi cantly in recent years. Recently,  the 
debate is shaped by concerns about housing aff ordability, particularly 
for the middle-and lower-middle-income groups, and this has 
impacted legislation, planning policy, economic development, as well 
as the industrial organization of the industry.
Challenges facing the industry are plenty, both on the demand and 
the supply sides (REHDA, 2013). On the demand side, the major 
issues confronting the industry are the widening aff ordability gap 
and a lack of demand for properties meant for certain target groups, 
including low-cost housing and Bumiputera-designated units. 
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Supply (in terms of number of units completed) is inadequate and the 
mismatch in pricing and location has translated into over-demand in 
some locations and for specifi c types of housing.   
Real Estate Market Structure
What is industrial organization (IO)? Simply put, IO is that branch of 
economics that is concerned with the study of imperfect competition. 
A market described as less than perfectly competitive leaves open 
wide possibilities. It could be a duopoly market with only two fi rms, or 
perhaps a market dominated by one large fi rm competing with many 
very small ones. The products of the diff erent fi rms may be identical, 
as in the case of residential developers, or highly diff erentiated, as in 
the case of electrical & electronic appliances. Entry by new fi rms may 
be easy, as in the contractor business, of diffi  cult, as in the automobile 
industry. This variety of possible market characterizations makes it 
diffi  cult to make broad, unambiguous statements about imperfectly 
competitive markets. 
In some economic sectors, such as manufacturing, (E&E), business 
services (Accountants), F&B (fast food restaurants), industry structure 
and its consequences are the subject of policy, news and scholarly 
att ention. By contrast, there has been litt le policy or scholarly interest 
in the structure of the (real estate) development industry even though 
it is a highly regulated, high value industry that shapes the industry. 
Mohd Isa, Tan Pek Voon, Shanti and Nasir (2010) reported that the real 
estate industry plays an important role in the Malaysian economy. In 
2000, a study conducted by the Economic Planning Unit of the Prime 
Minister’s Department demonstrated that a RM1.0 million investment 
in the housing sector resulted in a total multiplier eff ect of RM1.469 
million for the whole economy. In addition, the real estate industry 
is said to have strong linkages to more than 140 industry and major 
sources of employment. 
Litt le is known about the organization of the industry and its 
implications for matt ers such as effi  ciency, the structure of the building 
industry, and the relationship of the industry with regulations. 
This neglect is lamentable and the article aims to show that the 
development industry structure is an important topic demanding 
att ention. It does this by organizing  existing literature to outline 
some possible or likely implications of industry structure, for real 
estate industry (policy-maker, developers, academics) emphasizing 
particularly the consequences for a concentrating industry. These 
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potential consequences are of importance and wide ranging, 
concerning, amongst other things; the price and the nature of the real 
estate industry, the nature of planning, relations between planners 
and developers, sustainability and even the viability of planning as 
a government public policy.1 Useful study by Malpezzi and Mayo 
(1997) which analysed two separate but related issues on the eff ects of 
government interventions, taxes, subsidies, and regulations, and an 
aggregate analysis of housing-supply behaviour. The interventions 
analysis demonstrates that the costs of regulatory and pricing 
restrictions far outweigh the benefi ts of subsidies and regulatory 
exemptions. The aggregate supply model demonstrates the eff ects 
of such regulations on market prices and shows, using comparisons 
of the US, Thailand, and Korea, that countries with more stringent 
regulatory environments have less elastic supply of housing.       
Industrial Organization and the Structure of Industry
The structure-conduct-performance, hereafter the SCP framework 
(Table 1) in the fi eld of industrial economics consists of the structure 
of an industry which infl uences the conduct or behaviour of that 
industry, which in turn infl uences the performance of that industry, 
and that these dimensions also infl uence each other. The relation 
between IO and “conventional microeconomics” has changed over 
time (Aiginger, Mueller, & Weiss, 1998). IO became a specifi c economic 
fi eld primarily because economics could not handle the economies 
of scale, the presence of large fi rms, and product diff erentiation 
(Andrew, 1952). The distance to microeconomics grew pronounced, 
as the empirical strand became dominant, while microeconomics 
increasingly emphasized optimization, mathematics and formal 
models. In the eighties, IO accepted that the decision-makers in 
fi rms started out with an optimization problem, and then took the 
lead in promoting the concept that in a world of a few fi rms, strategic 
interactions were a crucial part of the story. Firms do not optimize in 
a given framework of exogenous variables, but in an environment in 
which other fi rms are, at the same time, practising the same exercise. 
IO modelled decisions as non-cooperative games, and exported this 
approach into other fi elds of economics.   
Ball (2003), states that house builders are characterized by the existence 
of a large number of relatively small fi rms. They also use production 
techniques that are labour-intensive and change relatively slowly. 
They also are ‘fl exible’ in order to be able to adapt to potentially large 
variations in output. Generally, as a result, scale economies are low, 
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which helps both to make the entry and the exit from the industry 
relatively easy and to explain the small average fi rm size. 
Healey and Barret (1990) argued that the way in which land and 
property are themselves ‘produced’ and consumed entered into the 
processes of economic production and consumption. Understanding 
these processes is thus a necessary task, both to assist in the practical 
activities of urban management and property development and 
economic development, and to develop a critical capacity to evaluate 
such practices. They adopted the approach by Giddens (1984), who 
argued for a relational approach between structure and agency in 
which ‘structure’ established by the way agents operate: deploying, 
acknowledging, challenging and potentially transforming resources, 
rules and ideas as they frame and pursue their own strategies. Healey 
and Barret (1990) added that structure, in terms of the framework 
within which individual agents make their choices, may be seen to 
inhere in the various resources to which agents may have access, 
the rules which they consider govern their behaviour, and the ideas 
which they draw upon in developing their strategies.    
 
Mohd Isa et al. (2010) added that the housing development industry is 
fragmented and dominated by small and medium-sized fi rms. They 
depend on the purchasers’ deposits and progress payments to roll the 
capital and stay in business. With this inclination, their motivation to 
build continues despite the unsold housing situation in the market. 
Compared to UK, the housing industry experienced a restructuring 
process where companies merged and there were take-overs of the 
smaller and weaker companies in the past two decades. Housing 
development companies emerged more diversifi ed and operated in 
more than one property sector. 
Table 1
Relationship between Industry Structure, Conduct and Performance
Structure Conduct
(Behaviour 
of fi rms in an 
industry)
Performance
(How market performs under 
diff erent structures)
Number of fi rms Pricing strategies Allocative effi  ciency
Size distribution of fi rms Product strategies Production effi  ciency
Cost structures Advertising Rate of technological advance
(continued)
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Structure Conduct
(Behaviour 
of fi rms in an 
industry)
Performance
(How market performs under 
diff erent structures)
Product diff erentiation R&D Quality & services
Vertical integration Plant investment Equity
Collusion
Mergers
Legal strategies
Sources.  Scherer &  Ross (1990)
Structure describes the characteristics and the composition of the 
markets and industries in an economy. At its most aggregated level, 
it relates to the relative importance of the broadly defi ned sectors 
of the economy (Ferguson & Ferguson, 1994). Here the focus is on 
the relative sizes of (and trends in) the primary (agriculture and the 
extractive industries), secondary (industrial) and tertiary (service) 
sectors. Secondly, structure can refer to the number and size 
distribution of the fi rms in the economy as a whole. Structure also 
relates to the importance and characteristics of individual markets 
within the economy. This is the sense of the term within the SCP 
approach. It can be identifi ed by considering the number and size 
distribution of buyers and sellers (market concentration), the extent 
to which products are diff erentiated, barrier to entry conditions, and 
the extent to which fi rms are integrated or diversifi ed.     
High perceptions of the development industry structure are either 
of a competitive industry or of one dominated by large powerful 
players. In a sense both perspectives are partly correct. Johnstone 
(1984) argued that housing is a very speculative industry, and the 
housing development industry has always been known as a rich man’s 
“game”. According to the report by JPPH (Property Market Report, 
2013), 381,130 transactions worth RM152.37 billion were registered in 
2013 against 427,520 transactions worth RM142.84 billion in 2012. The 
residential sub-sector retained the lion’s share in the property market, 
contributing 64.6% share in volume and 47.3% in value. The year 
registered 246,225 residential property transactions worth RM72.06 
billion. Housing units made up the majority with 81.9% (201,645 
units) of the market share. Terraced houses, being the most popular, 
contributed 38.8% (95,536 units) of residential transactions. 
The law applicable to housing developers in Peninsular Malaysia is 
the Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) Act, 1966 (Act 118), 
which came into force on August 29, 1969. The Act does not apply 
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to Sabah and Sarawak. Apart from the 1966 Act, the law governing 
housing development in West Malaysia is contained in the two 
regulations of 1989 and 1991. The Act does not apply to any society 
registered or incorporated under any writt en law relating to co-
operative societies. This means that housing projects undertaken by 
co-operative bodies are not governed by the 1966 Act. The Act also 
does not apply to housing projects undertaken by any statutory body 
or agency of the federal or state governments. Thus, housing projects 
undertaken by such agencies as the state economic development 
corporations (SEDCs) are not governed by this Act.   
Before a housing developer can develop a piece of land, certain 
procedures must be followed. These procedures can either be legal, 
such as conforming to the requirements of the National Land Code and 
other related laws, the Planning Act or the Environmental Quality Act, 
or the conformity might be in the form of administrative regulations or 
directives given by the government to fulfi ll certain policy objectives. 
This being the case, before a piece of land is developed with buildings 
put up on the land, certain legal and administrative procedures must 
be resolved, or else the developer or the landowner will face legal and 
administrative issues. The mistakes can be costly for the developer. 
Litigation in court might take a few years before the issues are fi nally 
decided. Any land development to be carried out by the private sector 
must be on alienated land, that is, land with a land title issued by the 
land offi  ce on behalf of the state authority. On alienation by the state 
authority, the land will be subjected to either one of the categories: 
agriculture, building or industry.
Keogh and D’Arcy (2002) examine property development from an 
institutional economic perspective. Their main focus is the property 
market as an institution, i.e. as a set of formal and informal rules 
governing the behaviour of the diverse property market actors. Based 
on their previous works, development is explored in the context of an 
institutional hierarchy in which three main levels can be identifi ed. 
First, the property market exists within an institutional framework 
defi ned by political, social, economic and legal rules and conventions 
by which the society in question is organized. At the next level, the 
property market is itself considered as an institution with a range of 
characteristics which describe its structure and determine its scope 
and function. Finally, at the third level, the main organizations that 
operate in the property market can be considered in terms of the 
way they are structured and the way they change. The relationship 
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between institutions and organizations at each level, and between 
levels, can best be described as interactive, defi ned in relation to one 
another and capable of change in response to action and experience. 
Concentration in Real Estate Market
Any analysis of a fi rm’s competitive environment involves identifying 
the key elements of industry structure. The most important 
characteristics of industry structure include the number and size 
distribution of fi rms, the existence and height of barriers to entry and 
exit, and the degree of product diff erentiation (Curry & George, 1983; 
Shepherd, 1982; Abdullah & Suhaila, 2006). Seller-concentration, 
an indicator of the number and size distribution of fi rms, can be 
measured at two levels:
1. All fi rms that form part of an economy, located within some 
specifi c geographical boundary;
2. All fi rms classifi ed as members of some industry or market, 
again located within some specifi c geographical boundary 
(Table 2, MSIC 2008).
Throughout much of microeconomics and IO, the terms “market” 
and “industry” tend to be used rather loosely, and sometimes 
interchangeably. Although the distinction is not rigid, it seems natural 
to use the term “industry” to refer specifi cally to a market’s supply 
side or productive activities, while the term “market” encompasses 
both supply/production, and demand/consumption (Lipczynski, 
Wilson, & Goddard; 2005). Kay (1990) sees markets as representing 
demand conditions, while industries represent supply conditions. 
In Kay’s terminology, the strategic market, defi ned as the smallest 
geographic or product area in which a fi rm can successfully compete, 
brings the industry and market together. 
Two measures of concentration take both the number of fi rms and the 
distribution of market share into account. The fi rst is the concentration 
ratio and the latt er is an index called the Herfi ndahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI).2 We used the 4-fi rm concentration ratio, as they are 
fairly easily understood indices of market power. Nonetheless it is 
not our intention here to discuss the limitation of such measures. A 
value close to zero would indicate that the largest K fi rms supply 
only a small share of the market; 100 per cent could indicate a single 
supplier.    
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The concentration ratio is the cumulative share of the K largest fi rms 
in the market, where here we chose four-fi rm concentration ratio 
(CR4) and measured by sales from the total transaction of property 
in 2010 and 2013.
          si
Where CRK = the Kith fi rm concentration ratio
 si = the percentage market share of the ith fi rm
There are no set rules for the choice of K, the number of large fi rms to 
be included in the calculation of CRk.
White (1981) discusses the criteria for the appropriate measurement 
of fi rm size: 
In the case of concentration in individual markets, we are 
searching for some inferences as to the likelihood of oligopolistic 
co-ordination concerning prices and sales. The (sales) shares 
of the oligopolists themselves will be a prime determinant of 
the likelihood of that co-ordination. Hence, industry sales are 
the proper measure of concentration calculations in individual 
industries.
The specifi c standards used for the four categories are familiar in the 
literature (Shrerer, 1980; Kaysen & Turner, 1959), as follows:
1.      Pure Monopoly: Market share at or near 100%, plus eff ectively 
blockaded entry, plus evidence of eff ective monopoly control 
over the level and structure of prices. In practice this includes 
mainly certain utilities and patented goods.
2.  Dominant Firms: A market share of 50% to over 90%, with no 
close rivals. A high entry barrier. An ability to control pricing, 
to set systematic discriminatory prices, to infl uence innovation, 
and (usually) to earn rates of return well above the competitive 
rate of return.
3. Tight Oligopoly: Four-fi rm concentration above 60%, with stable 
market share. Medium or high entry barriers. A tendency 
toward cooperation, shown especially by rigid prices. Excess 
profi ts are neither necessary nor suffi  cient to establish the 
existence of tight oligopoly. As a special case, government-
regulated fi rms which are able exert some degree of market 
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power rather than be wholly passive to regulation are included 
here. Also included are markets where the government assists 
collusion, even if the market’s concentration is low.
4. Eff ective Competition: Four-fi rm concentration below 40%, with 
unstable market shares and fl exible pricing. Low entry barriers, 
litt le collusion, and low profi t rates.   
The Data (5-digit; MSIC 2008)
Following MSIC, Section L real estate activities include acting as 
lessors, agents and/or brokers in one or more of the following: selling 
or buying real estate, renting real estate, providing other real estate 
services such as appraising real estate or acting as real estate escrow 
agents. Activities in this section may be carried out on own or leased 
property and may be done for a fee or on contract basis. Also included 
is the building of structures, combined with maintaining ownership 
or leasing of such structures. 
Table 2 
Real Estate Activities with Own or Leased Property (CR4 2010 & 2013)
Item Description CR4 < 40%
2010 2013
68101 Buying, selling, renting and operating self-owned or leased 
real estate-residential building 
68102 Buying, selling, renting and operating self-owned or leased 
real estate-non residential buildings1
68103 Buying, selling, renting and operating self-owned or leased 
real estate-land
68104 Development of building projects for own operation, i.e.  
renting of space in these buildings2
68109 Real estate activities with own or leased property n.e.c.3
Sources. Adaption from Statistics Dept. of Malaysia (2014)
(1)  Includes: offi  ces, shop houses, industrial units, exhibition halls, 
space in theatres, self-storage facilities, malls and shopping centres
(2)  Includes: providing homes and fl ats, apartments or 
condominiums for more permanent use (monthly or annual)
(3)  Includes: (a)       provision of space for animal boarding only
(b) operation of government owned
(c) subdividing real estate into lots, without land 
improvement
(d) operation of residential mobile home sites
ht
tp
://
ijm
s.
uu
m
.e
du
.m
y/
66        
IJMS 22 (1), 57–72 (2015)               
Table 2 shows that our fi nding on 4-fi rm concentration ratio for 2010 
and 2013 is less than 40%. It has not changed much from 2010 to 2013 
for real estate activities with own or leased property. Shepherd (1982) 
concluded that four-fi rm concentration below 40% was an eff ective 
competition with unstable market shares and fl exible pricing, low 
entry barriers, litt le collusion, and low profi t rates. For the level of 
the 5-digits 68101 with buying selling, renting and operating self-
owned or leased real estate-residential building was within eff ective 
competition (below 40%).   
The fi ve-digit industry concept was selected because it closely 
approximates the theoretical defi nition of an industry. The objective 
of an industrial classifi cation system is to classify data in respect 
of the economy according to the categories of activities and the 
characteristics which are similar. MSIC is a classifi cation of the kinds 
of economic activity and not a classifi cation of goods and services or 
a classifi cation of occupations.
  
Geithman, Marvel and Weiss (1980) argued that the critical 
concentration ratio can take two forms. The most common notion is that 
at some level of concentration, industries become eff ectively collusive 
so that profi t rates, price-cost margins, or prices rise to monopolistic 
levels. An alternative is that at some level of concentration they 
begin to aff ect performance. Below that level there is no relationship 
between concentration and performance, but above that level profi ts, 
margins, and/or prices rise with concentration.
  
Furthermore, according the neoclassical theory, the greater the 
number of fi rms and the more uniform they are in size, the greater 
the degree of competition is likely to be present. Internationally, the 
industry varies considerably in its degree of concentration (Buzzelli, 
2001). 
The initial capital outlay to enter the housing production business 
is viewed lower than any other production businesses (Mohd Isa et 
al., 2005). Jaafar and Ali (2011) studied on indigenous developers and 
they found that a majority of them preferred to develop medium-cost 
houses in sub-urban areas. This fi ndings showed that the sampled 
indigenous housing developers in Malaysia were more inclined to 
develop medium-cost houses, in particular single and double-storey 
terrace houses. Even the state corporations have shown interest in 
constructing medium and high-cost houses, albeit their major role is 
to actually construct and distribute low-cost houses (Agus, 1997). 
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Somerville (1999) points out that the traditional approach in 
housing-market analysis assumes that new residential structures 
are supplied by a perfectly competitive homebuilding industry. 
Researchers point to the large number of builders and the small 
share of the national market held by the country’s largest builders 
to support this assumption. His results are more consistent with 
treating homebuilders as monopolistically competitive suppliers of 
a diff erentiated product than treating them as perfectly competitive 
homogenous fi rms. Builders are larger in more active housing markets 
and where there is a greater supply of readily developed land suitable 
for large developments.        
In Europe, for example, housebuilding is more concentrated than 
in North America, though still much less than in other industries. 
Housebuilding in Britain and Europe is more concentrated than in 
North America because of the use of more capital-intensive building 
methods requiring large-fi rm resources, and the greater reliance 
on large-scale state contracts. This explains why, in places such as 
Australia, housebuiling is more like that in North America, where 
smaller fi rms are bett er represented.
Beck, Scott , and Yelowitz  (2012), argued that at the national level (US), 
both the NAR and the FTC/DOJ reports point out that the industry 
is not concentrated. But their added, real estate markets are local, 
so national-level market structure information is not dispositive. To 
determine whether supplier concentration at the local market level 
creates the potential for softer competition and price rigidity, data 
on the number and size shares of fi rms in local markets are required. 
Akintoye and Skitmore (1991) undertook an analysis of company 
accounts from 1980 to 1987, which segmented construction fi rms 
into contractors and housebuilders and examined the eff ect of size 
on returns. Three important conclusions were derived from their 
analysis: (a) The profi tability of contracting was found to be generally 
low and fairly constant at around 3% when measured as a ratio of 
turnover. This they att ributed to ‘excessive’ competition, though 
‘excessive’ is not defi ned, (b) housebuilders’ returns were greater 
than in contracting because of the greater risks and need for working 
capital and (c) larger fi rms had persistently higher rates of return 
which they att ributed to greater managerial effi  ciency. 
The work of Hui, Ooi, and Wong (2007) found that Hong Kong 
property companies that diversifi ed into other sectors appeared 
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to perform bett er than those focused solely in real estate. Property 
companies in Hong Kong generally achieved higher rates of returns 
on their capital invested than Singapore property companies.   
The Consequences and Competition
 
The number of housing developers has increased over the years, 
thereby fostering competitive environment in the industry. Based on 
the Economic Census (2011) results, a total of 8,277 establishments were 
operating in real estate services in Malaysia. Real estate activities with 
own or leased property had the highest number of establishments, 
6,934 or 83.8 per cent. Kuala Lumpur (2,557), Selangor (1,820) and 
Johor (914) registered the highest number of establishments. Size of 
fi rm varied widely by value of gross output. Nearly 71 per cent of the 
value of gross output was produced by the largest developers.  
Table 3 shows the principal statistics of real estate service activities by 
output size in 2010. The largest fi rm consisting of output size of RM10, 
000 million and above contributed almost 70% of the total value.  The 
number of establishments were high within the output size of RM5 
million to RM500 million. In Malaysia, the private sector has been 
the principal player since the late 1950s (Lim, 1997; Shuid, 2004). 
The increase in the private sector housing delivery had in part been 
helped by the increase in the number of housing developers. To get 
listed on the Bursa Malaysia (previously known as the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange), a company needs to meet certain requirements. For 
housing developers, they are required to possess a minimum land 
bank of 1,000 acres, have suffi  cient on-going property development 
projects, and obtain an aggregate after-tax profi t of not less than 
RM30 million for the fi ve full years (Ting, 2002). 
According to the basic theory of market structure, higher concentration 
will increase the fi rm’s profi t which will be followed by higher price 
thus increasing market power. Empirical studies often reveal that the 
association of profi t and market concentration is due to the ‘ability’ of 
fi rms to infl uence price levels. In other words, the more concentrated 
an industry is, the bett er for it to become monopolistic with higher 
price-cost margin or profi ts, which can gradually enhance market-
power of the industry.
The neoclassical analysis traditionally shows that monopoly leads 
to an inferior allocation of resources by restricting output below 
the competitive level. An optimal allocation of current resources 
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requires the output to be increased until the marginal benefi t derived 
by consumers equals the marginal cost of production. However, it 
is argued that this level of output will not be att ained because the 
monopolist maximizes profi t by equating marginal cost with marginal 
revenue. As a result there is a reduction in consumer surplus and 
deadweight welfare loss to society. 
  
Table 3 
Principal Statistics of Real Estate Service Activities by Output Size, 2010
Ouput
size
Number of 
establishments
Value 
of gross 
output
Value of 
intermediate
Input
Value
added
Salaries 
and 
wages 
paid
Value of 
fi xed assets 
owned as at 
the end of 
the year
(RM’000) (RM’000) (RM’000) (RM’000) (RM’000) (RM’000)
Total 8,277 18,648,494 7,130,646 11,517,848 1,579,880 46,762,854
Below 5 95 257 191 66 1,355 53,677
5 – < 100 2,594 11,9966 55,342 64,624 69,188 1,989,199
100 – < 200 1,376 19,7697 78,211 119,486 71,271 1,741,297
200 – < 500 1,680 535,399 207,170 328,229 146,633 2,973,257
500 – < 1,000 848 59,5004 210,126 384,878 146,633 3,027,087
1,000 – < 5,000 1,126 2,418,312 836,027 1,582,285 347,713 8,024,859
5,000 – < 10,000 230 1,586,012 570,664 1,015,348 154,904 5,681,237
10,000 – < and above 328 13,195847 5,172,915 8,022,932 661,722 23,272,241
Sources.  Adapted from Economic Census (2011)
Conclusion
Left to itself, real estate service activity would be a highly competitive 
industry. However, for the last few years, two issues have hogged 
market-aff ordability and the steep rise in prices in the landed 
residential sector, which subsequently spilled over to the high-
rise condominium market in the Klang Valley and in other cities. 
Developers argued that the sharp price hike of properties after 2006 
was due to a convergence of factors starting with a steep hike in 
the cost of building materials. Steel bars went up from RM1,500 per 
tonne to peak at RM3,800 before sett ling at about RM2,500. Similar 
steep price hikes were felt for cement, bricks and sand apart from 
related raw materials including fuel. At the same time land prices 
also appreciated steeply over the past decade. With regulations 
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for the sustainablity of real estate industry, the Housing and Local 
Government Ministry and the relevant authorities can play a greater 
role in controlling prices. In Singapore, Germany, South Korea and 
Australia, the authorities study the housing needs of their peoples.
End Notes
1 This article makes no claim to be an exhaustive or defi nitive statement on 
these issues. Instead, the hope is to draw att ention to this issue, to stimulate 
research and debate, and to encourage both practitioners and scholars to 
refl ection upon the implications of inaction.
2  A typical measure of industrial concentration. CR4 are used in this study. 
See Curry and George (1983) for an overview of measures of industrial 
concentration.
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